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Obviously Medina has not dealt a fatal blow to the time-honored rule that
a minor is not held to the same degree of care as an adult. Rather, it has
created a justifiable exception to that rule. Increasingly more minors are involved in traffic accidents, and despite recent emphasis on automobile safety
features, there is little hope for substantial physical protection. Inadequate
physical protection should be countered by ample legal protection, which
prevents a negligent minor from being shielded by a lesser degree of care
than required of adult drivers. As our affluent society becomes more technologically complex, the law must respond with the appropriate exceptions and
alterations needed to protect the public. Medina v. McAllister is such a
response.
JAN[Es L. PADGETT

SALES: IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967)
Plaintiff, while a hospital patient, received a transfusion of whole blood
supplied by the defendant blood bank and administered separately by hospital
personnel. After contracting viral hepatitis, she sued the blood bank alleging
the transfused blood contained serum hepatitis and the "sale" of such impure blood constituted a breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness. The trial court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the transfusion was a service; hence no implied warranties could attach. The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed,' declaring the transfer a sale and recognizing a cause of action for breach of implied warranty. The court concluded,
however, that if the defendant proved hepatitis virus could not be detected
in or eliminated from the donor's blood, such proof would be a valid defense
to the warranty claim. On further appeal, the supreme court, in a per curiam
opinion HELD, the blood transfusion did constitute a sale, and a cause of
action was stated for breach of warranty; however, the question of a valid
2
defense was premature and was erroneously considered.
undertaken by adults and for which adult qualifications are required, such as the operation
of an automobile, motorboat, motor scooter, or motorcycle." Although the court did not
make these instructions mandatory on the lower courts it did express confidence "that the
forms of instructions recommended by the committee state[d] as accurately as a group of
experienced lawyers and judges could state the law of Florida in simple understandable
language." This endorsement seems to affirm the doctrine of the instant case. In re Use by
the Trial Courts of the Standard Jury Instructions, No. 36,286 (Fla. Sup. Ct., April 19,
1967).

1.
2.

Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
196 So. 2d at 118.
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Transfer of blood from the healthy to the infirm heralded the first successful transplant of human tissue. 3 But the success of blood transfusions has
been marred by difficulties, the major one being the elimination of all impurities from the donor's blood before it is given to the patient. The real
culprit has been serum hepatitis. A recent study indicates that viral hepatitis
develops in one of every five hundred patients receiving transfusions. 4 The
rate probably has not diminished greatly to date since medical science has
discovered no method to detect or destroy the virus in whole blood. 5
A court allowing an action for breach of implied warranty would greatly
aid a plaintiff in these circumstances. If he sues for negligence he must
prove the blood service knew the blood contained serum hepatitis or, by
exercise of reasonable care, should have known it. This is virtually impossible. 6 With implied warranty the plaintiff's burden of proof is less since
courts can avoid issues of negligence and simply find the blood was neither
merchantable nor fit for human consumption. But breach of implied warranty is an aspect of the law of sales; 7 thus, to maintain this cause of action,
the transaction must be recognized as a sale. The determination whether a
transaction constitutes a service or a sale lies at the threshold of implied warranty. If held a service, warranty claims are prevented, and the plaintiff must
rely upon negligence. In the leading case, Perlmutter v. Beth David HospitalS
plaintiff contracted hepatitis from a transfusion. In a 4-3 decision the New
York Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's warranty claim holding the contract
between patient and hospital was predominantly for services, and any "sale"
aspects were incidental. All other jurisdictions faced with similar claims have
willingly followed the Perlmutter decision.9 This includes suits against independent blood banks as well as hospitals as suppliers of the blood.10 The
reluctance of courts to hold liable the suppliers of such a necessary commodity
3. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. on S. 2560 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
4. See Dunn, Blood Transfusions and Serum Hepatitis,15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 497 (1966).

5. "The possible presence of the agent of viral hepatitis in donors cannot be eliminated
by history, physical examination, laboratory test, or by any other means available today."
COINUirTTME ON STANDARDS, AM. A s'N OF BLOOD BANKS, STANDARDS FOR A BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICE 9 (4th ed. 1966). However, there has been developed a way for destroying hepatitis
in plasma. See Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINN. L. Rzv. 640, 656-57

(1958).
6. CostsirrrEE ON STANDARDS, Am. ASS'N OF BLOOD BANKS, supra note 5. Courts have
even refused to hold a physician liable in negligence for prescribing a transfusion that
has caused hepatitis. That the blood may be impure is a calculated risk about which the
physician must exercise his professional judgment. Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207, 137
N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct. CI. 1955), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 644, 151 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1956).
7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 670 (1965).
8. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
9. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H.
Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v. Kennewick
Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
10. E.g., Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, I Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965);
Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805
(1965).
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for undetectable impurities has been justified primarily on policy grounds.
The defendant has been termed a "nonprofit public service corporation,"11
a "voluntary and charitable activity which serves a humane and public health
purpose." 12 The transaction has been called a "gift" since, in many instances,
13
the patient is obligated to pay only a small service charge for the blood.
All the courts have noted the inability of medical science to locate serum
hepatitis in the blood.14 Several states have gone even further and enacted
laws specifically making blood transfusions a service, 15 thus effectively precluding recovery for plaintiffs unable to prove negligence.
By treating a blood transfusion as a sale, the Florida Supreme Court
has opened the door to liability under breach of warranty theory-a door
previously locked securely by every other jurisdiction that has considered
the question. 'Why has Florida rejected such strong decisional law, and can
the Russell decision be justified in light of existing Florida law and policy?
Florida courts embrace a liberal application of implied warranty doctrine,
which amounts to strict liability when such warranties have been breached.
Lack of knowledge of a product's danger is insufficient as a defense to a warranty claim.16 Privity requirements have essentially been negated with regard
to all products,'1 the result being that an injured plaintiff stands a great
chance of recovering for damage caused by any defective goods sold to him.
But few cases have tested the applicability of warranty theory on the basis
of the sale versus service dichotomy. An early Florida decision prescribed the
presently followed definition of a sale: "[Where property is taken for a fixed
money price the transfer amounts to a sale whether the price be paid in
money or in goods." 1 This definition was relied upon in Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp.19 when the Florida Supreme Court held the serving of
food in restaurants for value constituted a sale. Reasoning that there was no
difference between consumption of food on or off the premises, the court
concluded the real basis of the sale was the transfer of food for value, even
though part of a larger service. Blood, like food, is meant for human consumption, and a transfusion is clearly part of a larger service performed by
the hospital or blood bank. This factual analogy between Cliett and Russell
shows the consistency of the latter decision with existing law.
11. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 152-53,
132 N. W.2d 805, 807 (1965).
12. Id. at 159, 132 NAV.2d at 811.
13. Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 328, 402 P.2d 584, 586
(1965).
14. Cases cited notes 9, 10 supra.
15. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-1151 (Supp. 1964); CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE
§1623 (Deering 1955). The Arizona statute reads: "The procurement, processing, distribution
or use of whole human blood, plasma, blood products and blood derivatives for the purpose
of injecting or transfusing them into the human body shall be construed as to the transmission of serum hepatitis to be the rendition of a service by every person participating
therein and shall not be construed to be a sale."
16. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
17. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1965).
18. Edwards v. Baldwin Piano Co., 79 Fla. 143, 149, 83 So. 915, 917 (1920).
19. 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
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Of special interest is the district court's desire in Russell to grant the
blood bank a defense under comment k, section 402A, of the Restatement of
Torts.2 0 Under this section, if the blood were deemed "unavoidably unsafe,"

defendant would not be liable. Such a defense would result in a movement
away from the strict liability of implied warranty and toward negligence.
If it is permitted, plaintiff's warranty action is as effectively precluded as if
the transfusion were declared a service. The Russell court held that judicial consideration of section 402A was untimely. Therefore, it granted itself a second opportunity to refuse to apply absolute liability to blood banks
for breach of implied warranty. A previous decision indicates that the supreme court may so utilize this second chance in favor of the defendant. In
McLeod v. W. S. Merrill Co., 21 the court employed section 402A in holding
druggists exempt from strict liability for selling experimental drugs not
considered absolutely safe. The social utility of providing such drugs justified the risk taken.2 2 Similarly, transfusion of blood has become a medical
necessity. The possibility of serum hepatitis in the blood is a risk that is
widely recognized by the medical profession; 23 therefore, to place blood transfusions under the "unavoidably unsafe" rule would be a viable and preferable
alternative to strict liability.
Significantly, the "unavoidably unsafe" concept was considered by the
24
Florida Legislature in a bill recently introduced and passed by the senate.
This bill applied the doctrine of implied warranty in suits against blood
banks, but provided an exception where proof was offered that the harmful
substance in the blood could not be detected or eliminated. If the bill is
enacted into law at a later session its effect will be to grant an affirmative
defense to the blood banks, thus tending to cause the action to sound in
negligence. However, the plaintiff will be relieved of proof of such negligence since this burden will fall upon the defendant. As in the Russell case,
such a statute would permit adjudication of the merits, rather than dismissal
at the outset by holding the transfusion a service.25 By putting the blood
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, commenf k at 353-54 (1965), states in part:
"Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use.... The seller of such products ... is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk."
21. 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
22. Id. at 739.
23. Hearings,supranote 3, at 7.
24. FLA. S.B. 433 (July 7, 1967). As amended, the bill was passed by a vote of 46-1 in
the senate. It stated: "The doctrine of implied warranty shall apply in cases involving the
procurement, processing, storage, distribution, or use of whole blood, blood plasma, blood
products, or blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the same or any
of them into the human body, where action is brought to recover damages for injury or
death resulting from such injecting or transfusing, except in those cases in which there is
proof offered that the deleterious substance causing death or injury was not capable of
detection or removal." The bill was referred to the house of representatives where it died,
as a result of inaction, at the closing of the session.
25. See statutes cited note 15 supra.
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banks to their proof in each case such a law could well aid in a more selective
and careful processing of blood and spur research to discover more quickly
a method to prevent hepatitis in transfused blood. The failure of the passage
of this bill leaves the obligation with the judiciary to reconsider and expand
the basic holding of the Russell decision.
The practical effects of the Russell decision overshadow the conceptual
or legal aspects of the case. The district court distinguished between blood
furnished by a blood bank and by a hospital, declaring that blood supplied
by the latter could not be considered a sale.26 However, many blood banks

are organized and run solely for the benefit of a particular hospital because
the hospital does not possess the facilities to operate its own blood service.27
The Russell decision may cause such independent blood banks to merge with
hospitals to avoid strict liability. If such consolidations are not feasible, the
blood banks may resort to operation on a commercial, profitmaking basis.
28
Presently most blood services are nonprofit public service corporations.
Surveys indicate commercial blood banks are less selective in procuring healthy
donors.2 9 Since one of the best preventives of transfusion deaths and injuries
is a careful selection of donors, widespread commercialization will tend to
increase potential harm.
A further possible result is that blood banks will voluntarily close, fearing
that until a method for destroying hepatitis is discovered, their liability is
inevitable. The state may then be forced to subsidize the services or operate
its own blood service in lieu of the independent banks. If the state refuses
to waive its immunity regarding transfusion injuries, the law will have come
full circle, accomplishing nothing except severely disrupting the medical
profession.
With Florida's disregard of privity in warranty actions, Russell lends support to the proposition that an injured plaintiff may recover from a donor
who supplied the impure blood. But unless the donor consciously misrepresents his physical condition, it seems unlikely such liability will extend
so far. If it did, a substantial decrease in blood supply could well result,
and encouragement of donations is essential to modern surgical medicine.
In addition, blood is not bought and sold on an ordinary commercial
basis. Rather, the transfusion is authorized by a physician for a patient who,
in all likelihood, is in no condition to bargain and who certainly makes no
decision whether he needs the transfusion. 30 He assumes no risk that his
health may be impaired by a transfusion of impure blood. Between two
innocent parties the onus of compensation would appear to fall more justly
upon the blood bank. Insurance may offer a solution, but if the rate of
hepatitis infections cannot be reduced, the premiums would be exorbitant
and the financial imposition may force blood banks to close their doors.
26.

Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, 752 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).

27. Hearings,supra note 3, at 6.
28. Id. Accord, Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn.
151, 152, 132 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1965).

29. Hearings,supra note 3, at 7.
30. Id. at 6.
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